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D

oes incivility in political discourse have adverse effects on public regard for politics? If so, why?
In this study we present a theory suggesting that when viewers are exposed to televised political
disagreement, it often violates well-established face-to-face social norms for the polite expression
of opposing views. As a result, incivility in public discourse adversely affects trust in government. Drawing
on three laboratory experiments, we find that televised presentations of political differences of opinion
do not, in and of themselves, harm attitudes toward politics and politicians. However, political trust is
adversely affected by levels of incivility in these exchanges. Our findings suggest that the format of much
political television effectively promotes viewer interest, but at the expense of political trust.

oes incivility in political discourse affect public regard for politics? Or is a certain amount
of rancorous debate part and parcel of what
citizens expect from political actors? Is watching
politicians and pundits hurl insults at one another on
television merely a harmless pastime, or does it have
consequences for how people think about politics and
government? In particular, does televised political incivility harm levels of trust in government and politicians?
There is now widespread concern in the United
States about a “civility crisis” in public life. As Rodin
(1996) suggests, “Across America and increasingly
around the world, from campuses to the halls of
Congress, to talk radio and network TV, social and
political life seem dominated today by incivility. . . . No
one seems to question the premise that political debate has become too extreme, too confrontational, too
coarse.” Calls for greater civility in political discourse
have come from a wide array of scholars, as well as
from philanthropic organizations that see incivility as
a threat to the functioning of democracy.1 But to date,
there has been little effort to confirm empirically the
negative consequences of incivility.
A number of scholars suggest that incivility in
political discourse is one of the key reasons why
Americans tend to be negative toward politicians and
political institutions. According to this line of thought,
political conflict is seen as unnecessary and distasteful. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 147) explain,
“Citizens . . . dislike being exposed to processes endemic to democratic government. People do not wish
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to see uncertainty, conflicting options, long debate,
competing interests, confusion, bargaining, and compromised, imperfect solutions.” Durr, Gilmour, and
Wolbrecht (1997) similarly suggest that it is precisely
when Congress is doing its job, debating and ultimately
resolving controversial political issues, that public regard for this institution declines.
Others argue more narrowly, suggesting that it is not
conflict per se, but the incivility with which political
elites disagree that prompts negative attitudes. Uslaner
(1993), for example, has suggested that members of
Congress are increasingly likely to violate norms of
politeness in their discourse, and Tannen (1998) characterizes the United States as “a culture of argument”
that encourages “a pervasive warlike atmosphere.” To
the casual observer, politicians seem to be perpetually
involved in bitter conflict. If political conflict is aired
openly in an uncivil fashion, can citizens be expected
to maintain respect for politics and politicians?
Televised portrayals of political conflict have received a particularly severe beating with respect to
levels of civility. Elving (1994), for example, cites
television coverage of congressional floor debate as
an important source of dissatisfaction with Congress.
Cappella and Jamieson (1997) point to media reports
that highlight conflict in politics as a source of greater
political cynicism. The increasing visibility of political conflict through television seems indisputable (see
Funk 2001), and even journalists concur that in American politics, “hyperbole and venomous invective are
common talk.”2 Viewers’ sense that politicians are
engaged in pointless bickering is assumed to be fed
by media coverage emphasizing the intensity of conflict whenever possible (see also, McGraw, Willey, and
Anderson 1998).
It is unclear whether elite political discourse is really
any less civil than in the days when duels were occasionally used to resolve differences of opinion (see,
e.g., Altschuler and Blumin 2000 and Sapiro 1999).
However, the dominance of television as a source of
exposure to politics suggests that, at the very least,
2 Michiko Kakutani, “Polarization of National Dialogue Mirrors Extremists of Left and Right.” The New York Times, 26 November 2000,
National Section, p. 27.
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the extent of mass public exposure to uncivil political
discourse probably has increased. It is one thing to read
about political pundits’ or candidates’ contrary views
in the press, and quite another to witness them directly
engaged in vituperative argument “in person.”3
More general theories suggesting that television
bears some responsibility for negative attitudes toward
politics and politicians have received enthusiastic receptions over the years. For some, the root of the problem is the cynicism of game-centered political coverage and journalists’ ongoing denigration of politicians’
motives; for others, it is simply the conflict-oriented,
adversarial nature of political coverage. The timing of
the well-documented decline in trust toward governmental institutions initially gave these theories great
plausibility, but documenting a causal link between
political television and negative public attitudes has
proven quite difficult. This difficulty stems from a lack
of certainty about which aspects of political television
are most likely to produce negative attitudes, and from
problems inherent in studying media effects.

TELEVISION AND POLITICAL TRUST
In the 1970s, Robinson (1975) popularized the term
“videomalaise” to refer to negative public attitudes
that resulted from watching television news. Evidence
in support of the original videomalaise claim was based
on a quasi-experimental study of effects from viewing one particular television program. In a subsequent
study (Robinson and Appel 1979), content analyses of
the three major network news programs showed that
negative coverage predominated. Although evidence
of effects remained thin thereafter, an overview of research on television and politics in the early 80s echoed
the popularity of this thesis, concluding that political
television “has altered the culture significantly by intensifying ordinary Americans’ traditional low opinion
of politics and politicians, by exacerbating the decline
in their trust and confidence in their government and
its institutions” (Ranney 1983, 86).
Despite the widespread belief that television has
something to do with low levels of political trust, evidence supporting this causal claim has been limited.
In addition, current theories linking trust to political
media have little to do with television per se. Instead,
theories about videomalaise have broadened into more
general claims about political journalism, claims that
transcend television, newspapers, and virtually all political media. Patterson (1993), for example, blames
negative news coverage from all media for unfavorable
attitudes toward politicians. He suggests that negative
commentary from journalists naturally leads members
of the public to think ill of politicians and the system in which they are embedded (see also Miller,
Goldenberg, and Erbring 1979). In addition, journalistic narratives emphasizing the ulterior, self-interested
motives of political actors have been widely blamed for
3 Even when candidates “talk past” one another in their discourse,
they tend to do so in a more aggressive manner than is common in
everyday conversation.
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public negativity. If the strategic, “inside dopester” perspective predominates, then the public’s attitudes will
increasingly reflect this same cynicism (see Cappella
and Jamieson 1997).
The shift toward more general theories of “mediamalaise” does not mean that television has been given
a complete reprieve from its responsibility for all that
ails American politics. Instead, the argument evolved
to blame television journalism for initiating the deleterious shifts in tone and content that subsequently
spread to other political media. Because of the need to
compete with television, print media began to mimic
television, at least so the argument goes (cf. Sigelman
and Bullock 1991). Whatever the rationale, few scholars now contend that political television, as it currently
exists, presents a unique perspective on government
and politics.
The few exceptions to this generalization are studies
suggesting that television, by virtue of its visual nature,
draws attention to certain dimensions of candidate
evaluation over others. As one journalist summarized
it in the early 70s, “Television makes the candidate of
today a human being at one’s elbow, who is going to
be judged on the same terms as a man greets any new
acquaintance” (Gould, [1952] 1972, 21). The sensory
realism of television conveys a sense of intimacy with
political actors that citizens were unlikely to encounter
in the past, even in face-to-face meetings with politicians (Hart 1994).
At this point, scholars have only begun to study the
consequences of the up-close and personal intimacy
that viewers have with political actors on television.
The main emphasis thus far in the research has been
on the extent to which televised politics heightens the
importance of personality characteristics in general
evaluations of candidates. Keeter (1987), for example,
found that candidates’ personal qualities were more
important to voters who obtained political news from
television. More recently, Druckman (2003) also found
that television primes people to rely more on personality perceptions when evaluating candidates. But we
know little about how citizens react to uncivil political
discourse when it is up-close and personal on television.
Would trust in politics and politicians improve if the
public simply did not witness so much uncivil political
disagreement on television? Drawing on social psychological theories of human–media interaction, we suggest that televised political disagreements exacerbate
the “intensification of feeling” that Walter Lippmann
(1925) so despised in politics. When political actors engage in televised interactions that violate the norms for
everyday, face-to-face discourse, they reaffirm viewers’
sense that politicians cannot be counted on to obey
the same norms for social behavior by which ordinary
citizens abide.
Without disputing previous evidence about television’s influence on political trust, this study offers a
different rationale for why incivility may intensify negative attitudes toward government and politicians. We
examine the impact of televised examples of uncivil political discourse, not because incivility is limited to television but, rather, because television is the dominant
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medium through which citizens are exposed to political
controversy, and because its images and sounds more
completely mimic conflict in real interpersonal situations. Funk (2001), for example, found that incivility
among members of Congress conveyed through print
produced findings in the direction one would expect,
but they did not reach statistical significance—–a null
finding she predicts would change using televised variations in civility. Our goal in this study was to explore
reactions to political television that conveys civility and
incivility in a manner more similar to face-to-face interaction, that is, with a rich array of cues tied to language,
speech, and expression.

A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR
VIDEOMALAISE
To trust is to assume that a person or institution will
“observe the rules of the game” (Citrin and Muste 1999,
465) and to believe that those involved will act “as they
should” (Barber 1983). But what does that imply in the
context of televised political disagreement? We propose this means that people expect political actors who
appear on television to abide by the same social norms
acknowledged by ordinary Americans. To be sure, the
actual norms for behavior on television are very different from what they are in the world of everyday social
interaction. But we hypothesize that when political actors violate interpersonal social norms on television,
viewers react as they would if they were witnessing
the same interaction in real life. In other words, their
emotional reactions are not mediated by the cognitive
acknowledgement that this is “only television,” and
thus they react quite negatively to incivility.4 Below we
review past evidence that supports this idea, beginning
with what we know about reactions to incivility and
disagreement in real life.
In face-to-face settings where people disagree about
politics, there are strong social norms likely to be observed for purposes of these interactions. Face-to-face
exchanges are relatively polite. Although people occasionally yell at one another and stomp their feet over
political differences, such behavior is far more common
in mediated presentations of political views. Norms involving politeness are extremely strong (Brown and
Levinson 1987); most people are polite most of the
time.
The experience of political conflict on television
often differs substantially from real life. Increased
market competition has encouraged political shows
to “liven themselves up” in order to increase audience size (Fallows 1996). Programs such as the
McLaughlin Group, The O’Reilly Factor, Meet the
Press, Crossfire, Capital Gang, and Hardball depict particularly intense and heated exchanges. Even standard
news programs are increasingly characterized by an
4 The hypothesis that television is able to elicit a greater intensity
of emotional reactions has been around for some time, but it has
met with mixed success in empirical studies (see Hibbing and TheissMorse 1998 for a review). This study addresses a narrower, more
specific hypothesis and proposes a specific mechanism of influence.
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emphasis on controversy and contentiousness. Civil
and polite exchanges of opinion do occur on television, and screaming sometimes occurs in interpersonal
discussions surrounding politics, but the central tendency in media is to highlight emotionally extreme and
impolite expressions, whereas the central tendency in
face-to-face communication is toward polite and emotionally controlled interactions. Consistent with this
evidence, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1998) find that
people who obtain news from television or radio generate significantly more negative emotional evaluations
of Congress, though their cognitive evaluations are indistinguishable.
Polite manners and other pleasantries may seem extraneous to political trust, but the need for politeness is
particularly great when expressing controversial views.
As Kingwell (1995) suggests, politeness and civility are
not arbitrary norms akin to using the correct fork; they
are a means of demonstrating mutual respect. Empirical studies substantiate the importance of adhering to
social norms of politeness. Tyler (1990), for example,
finds that politeness and respect toward individuals involved in a legal conflict enhances their perceptions of
fair treatment.
In addition to being less civil, the television world
also provides a uniquely intimate perspective on
conflicts. Interestingly, in the literature on human proxemics, the distance deemed appropriate for face-toface interactions with public figures in American culture is beyond 12 feet (see Aiello 1987), yet most
citizens’ exposure to politicians via television has the
appearance of being far closer. When people argue, it is
typically unpleasant, and the tendency is to back off, especially if one is personally involved in the argument. In
contrast, as televised political conflicts intensify, cameras close in with tighter and tighter perspectives on
the people involved. This creates a highly unnatural
experience for viewers, one in which they view conflict
from an extremely intimate perspective, and one that
would be highly unlikely to occur in the real world.
When social norms for civility are violated on television, the viewer’s intimate perspective intensifies an
already negative reaction to incivility.5
Of course, this hypothesis rests on the assumption
that watching conflict on television is much the same
experience for citizens as when conflict is face-to-face.
While this may seem unlikely, an accumulation of evidence suggests otherwise. Reeves and Nass (1996, 13),
for example, have documented responses to mediated
images that parallel those found in the natural world.
For example, when motion appears on a television
screen, physiological responses are the same as when
motion occurs in the immediate environment. When
5 This pattern of reactions is well documented in the realm of faceto-face interactions. For example, Storms and Thomas (1977) used
bogus questionnaire answers to convince experimental subjects that
a confederate’s attitudes were either similar to or dissimilar from his
or her own. When the confederate sat unusually close to the subject,
violating the norms for personal space, physical distance interacted
with similarity so that an attitudinally similar person who sat close
was even better liked, and a dissimilar person who sat close was even
more strongly disliked (see also Schiffenbauer and Schiavo 1976).
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viewers see a picture of a person on a screen who
appears to be closer by virtue of his or her size on
the screen, evaluations of the person on the screen
are more intense, just as they are when real people
come closer (see also Lombard 1995 and Lombard
et al. 2000). Based on these experiments, Reeves and
Nass (1996) conclude that the human brain has not
evolved quickly enough to respond in rational ways to
technologies such as television. As they put it, “People
expect media to obey a wide range of social and natural
rules. All these rules come from the world of world of
interpersonal interaction.”
Television and film, more than newspapers or radio,
provide an approximation of human experience in
terms of visual and aural sensory input. Moreover, research suggests that people’s default reactions to television tend to be primitive and automatic. The prospects
for unthinking and automatic social responses are
greatest with television because it more closely replicates human experience (see Lang 2000). The visual
element of television encourages “gut reactions” on
the part of viewers, which are not mediated by cognitive assessments (see Sullivan and Masters 1987).6
Although people may be well aware that different social norms characterize televised interactions, they may
nonetheless respond to televised depictions of political
actors based on norms for “real” life. As Mansbridge
(1983) has noted, when there is open political conflict
in real life, bringing people together in one another’s
presence can intensify their anger and aggression. To
the extent that a television presence has similar effects,
we would expect greater negativity to result.
To summarize, when encountering differences of
opinion in person, the tendency is for people to downplay their differences and maintain a polite, cordial
atmosphere; in contrast, mediated portrayals of political conflict emphasize strong differences of opinion, at least in part to enhance dramatic value and
attract viewers. Television further intensifies the negative, conflictual aspects of the experience by causing
viewers to experience uncivil exchanges of political
views from a highly intimate perspective. The central hypothesis in this study is that this violation of
social norms should cause negative reactions toward
politicians and government. People expect others to
obey social norms and evaluate them less favorably
when they do not. In addition, given that the normative expectation is of civility, this influence should be
primarily a function of negative reactions to incivility,
rather than positive reactions to civility. Finally, we further hypothesize that television viewers will respond
negatively to incivility on television due to largely
gut-level, emotional reactions to violations of social
norms rather than a cognitive awareness of excessive
conflict.

6 Although these studies focused specifically on the effects of politicians’ nonverbal facial displays on public attitudes, their findings
likewise suggest that expressive displays have a direct emotional
impact on viewers (see McHugo et al. 1985 and Sullivan and Masters
1987).
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STUDY DESIGN
Experimental methods provide the best means for testing this hypothesis. First, problems with the validity and
reliability of self-reported media exposure are wellknown (Price and Zaller 1993). An expectation that
people can accurately report levels of exposure specifically linked to televised incivility is unreasonable and
beyond most people’s capacities. Moreover, an experimental design makes it possible to evaluate the impact
of a subtle variation in the presentation of political
conflict—–the level of civility in the interaction—–while
holding the substantive content of the disagreement
constant. In addition, as demonstrated by the third experiment in this study, a laboratory setting made it possible to use an indirect means of gauging the intensity of
subjects’ reactions to a televised interaction. Measuring viewers’ physiological reactions to civil and uncivil
political conflict provided insight into the psychological processes underlying the effects we observed. Experimental designs also were essential to draw strong
causal inferences. Those who distrust government may
be particularly drawn to uncivil television content; if
so, reverse causation could be problematic, or spurious
relationships could result from correlates of distrust
and television watching.
The central manipulation in our experiments was the
extent to which politicians exchanged political viewpoints in a manner that violates the typical norms governing face-to-face political conflict. In three experiments using adults and undergraduate subjects,7 we
exposed viewers to systematically different versions of
four different political disagreements that were drawn
from a larger pool. We systematically manipulated the
extent of civility and politeness in these expressions of
political difference, without altering the political content of the exchanges. We expected that when dissonant
views were presented in an uncivil fashion, they would
encourage more negative, distrustful attitudes toward
politics and politicians.
To produce stimuli for these studies, professional actors were hired to play the roles of two congressional
candidates. A television studio with a political talk
show set was used to tape a mock program in which
the disagreements appeared. While seated around a
common table on the set, a moderator directed questions to the two candidates. The cover story was that
Bob Lindzey and Neil Scott, two candidates for an open
congressional seat, were invited to appear on Indiana
Week In Review in order to familiarize potential voters
with their positions.
7 Adult subjects were recruited through temporary employment
agencies, and they were paid for their participation by the agency
at the hourly rate they had agreed on with the agency. Student
subjects were recruited from political science courses as part of a
class opportunity for extra credit. All subjects were invited to participate “in a study that involves watching television.” In Experiment
1, 75% of the subjects were college students, and the remaining 25%
were recruited from the community. In Experiment 2, 45% of the
subjects were students, and 55% were drawn from the community.
In Experiment 3, all subjects were recruited from the community.
We found no systematic difference in the reactions of student and
nonstudent subjects.
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In order to ensure the same political content
in the civil and uncivil versions of the discussion,
teleprompters were used to help the actors adhere
closely to a script. The script drew on arguments from
interest groups that were for and against the issues.
Candidates were always assigned to opposing views
on each of the issues, and they were both directed
to interact in either a civil or an uncivil fashion. In
order to avoid subject fatigue, only a subset of four
of the issue disagreements was used in each experiment. Experiment 1 included discussion of free trade,
mental health insurance, Internet privacy regulation,
and NASA funding. Experiment 2 covered tobacco
regulation, taxation of retail sales on the Internet, public service experience, and free trade. The issues discussed in Experiment 3 included regulation of the tobacco industry, Internet taxes, the repeal of the Glass–
Steagall Act, and whether public service experience
is an important qualification for office. Each issue exchange was edited so that it was roughly five minutes
long.
Two versions of each exchange were taped on the
talk show set. The candidates expressed exactly the
same issue positions in the same words in both versions,
and offered exactly the same arguments in support
of their positions. But in the civil version the candidates went to extremes to be polite to the opposition, inserting phrases such as “I’m really glad Bob
raised the issue of . . .” and “I don’t disagree with all of
your points, Bob, but . . .” before calmly making their
own positions clear. Both candidates fully observed
the interpersonal norms for civility in expressing their

FIGURE 1.

viewpoints, not only in their own speech, but also by
waiting patiently while the other person answered and
by paying attention to the opponent while he was
speaking.
In the uncivil version of these exchanges, the candidates used the same script but inserted gratuitous
asides that suggested a lack of respect for and/or frustration with the opposition. Sample statements include
comments such as “You’re really missing the point here
Neil” and “What Bob is completely overlooking is. . . . ”
The candidates also raised their voices and never apologized for interrupting one another. Nonverbal cues
such as rolling of the eyes and rueful shaking of the
head from side to side were also used to suggest lack
of respect for what the opponent was saying. Voices
were raised when conflict intensified, in contrast to the
persistently calm voices of the candidates in the civil
version.
Manipulation checks confirmed that the two versions
of each issue discussion were perceived as significantly
different in levels of civility. In Experiment 1, two
items confirmed that subjects in the uncivil condition
perceived Neil and Bob to be significantly less polite than in the civil condition (t = 1.96, p < .05). In
Experiment 2, subjects were asked to evaluate the
speakers on an expanded battery of manipulation check items, including adjective pairs ranging
from “quarrelsome” to “cooperative,” “friendly” to
“hostile,” “emotional” to “unemotional,” “calm” to
“agitated,” and “rude” to “polite.” As shown in
Figure 1, the candidates in the uncivil versions of the
issue exchanges were consistently perceived as less

Manipulation Checks for Civil/Uncivil Issue Debates
Civil
0

1

2

3

Uncivil
4

5

6

7

Friendly-Hostile
Polite-Rude
Unemotional-Emotional
CooperativeQuarrelsome
Calm-Agitated
Conservative-Liberal
Democrat-Republican

Source: Experiment 2.
Note: Comparisons are of means on a zero-to-eight scale. All civil/uncivil comparisons addressing nonpolitical differences were significantly different from one another. The t-values for the comparisons from the top to the bottom of the figure were as follows: t = 7.04,
p < .001; t = 8.83, p < .001; t = 3.07, p < .01; t = 4.51, p < .001; and t = 5.29, p < .001. Means for ideology and partisanship did not
differ significantly by condition.
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polite, more quarrelsome, more emotional, agitated,
and hostile.8 Equally important are the two null findings at the bottom of Figure 1. There were no perceived ideological differences in a candidate’s stand
as it appeared in the civil versus the uncivil condition,
thus affirming our effort to keep the political substance
espoused by each candidate constant.

Procedures
Participants sat alone in a room with a small, comfortable couch and an overstuffed chair, plus a coffee table
and a 32-inch television. After consent to participate
was obtained, they filled out a pretest questionnaire.
Subjects then viewed 20 minutes of the televised political program, incorporating the same scripted disagreements on four different issues,9 and, afterward, filled
out posttest questionnaires. Subjects were debriefed
after all experiments. They were told that their answers
were being compared to those of others who watched a
different version of the same program. But subjects in
Experiment 2 were not told our hypotheses in order to
facilitate follow-up interviews by phone for those who
consented.
Although the experimental procedure was basically
the same in the two experiments, in Experiment 1 subjects were randomly assigned to civil or uncivil conditions (n = 67), while in Experiment 2, we incorporated
a third, control condition in which subjects did not
watch any political television (n = 155).10 The control
group was included in the second experiment to determine whether differences between the civil and the
uncivil conditions were due to an elevation of political
trust in the civil condition, a decrease in trust in the
uncivil condition, or some combination thereof. The
participants randomly assigned to the control group
watched a nonpolitical program for the same amount
of time that the treatment groups watched the talk
show11 , and filled out the same questionnaires.12 In Experiment 3, we focused on understanding the process
of influence that accounts for the pattern of findings
in the two previous experiments. For these purposes
we utilized a within-subjects experimental design in
which all subjects were assigned to both the civil and
8 Although we refer to the two versions as “civil” and “uncivil,” it
should be noted that relative to contemporary political talk shows,
even the “uncivil” version would not be viewed as extremely hostile.
Relative to exchanges between candidates and members of Congress,
the portrayals in these experiments were highly realistic and well
within the range of what people expect of congressional candidates.
None of our subjects questioned their authenticity.
9 In the first experiment, the order of presentation of the four issue
discussions was randomized. In the second experiment, we used a
fixed order (free trade, tobacco, Internet taxes, and public service).
10 This time the list of issues included NASA funding, mental health
insurance, a federal Internet privacy policy, and free trade.
11 The nonpolitical program was an instructional video on how to
improve one’s free throw shooting ability, combined with a brief
history of the NBA. All tapes are available for viewing upon request.
12 The issues discussed in Experiment 2 were restrictions on tobacco
advertising, free trade, taxes on Internet purchases, and whether
previous public service/political experience is an asset or a liability
for members of Congress.
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the uncivil conditions in randomly determined orders
for the discussion of four different issue disagreements.
Measuring Political Trust. The best-known measures
of political trust are those from the National Election
Studies battery that are labeled under the rubric of
support for the political system. We utilized these measures as dependent variables in our study, though not
exclusively so. To address all of the various types of
trust that have been linked to political television, we
included questions to form three separate political trust
indexes tapping Trust in Politicians, Trust in Congress,
and Trust in the Political System. Although it is customary to define different kinds of trust by virtue of the
target being trusted (the political system, politicians
in power, etc.), we found, consistent with Citrin and
Muste (1999, 467), that while items used to measure
political trust may have different target objects, they
are of “dubious discriminant validity.” For this reason
we do not claim to have measured empirically distinct
concepts, nor does our theory make differential predictions. However, because indicators have traditionally
been grouped by target object, we did the same in our
initial analyses, but also provide a pooled analysis that
combines the three dimensions of political trust.13
Our theory suggests that people will be less likely
to trust politicians if they are seen as uncivil in their
interactions with one another—–even though that may
well be considered the norm for political television.
When political actors do not behave according to social norms, viewers are reminded that politicians do
not appear to abide by the same rules of the game
as everyone else. Norm violations should generate a
negative reaction, much as they do when people are
exposed to such violations in real life.

RESULTS
Experiment 1
The goal of the first experiment was to assess whether
the extent of civility in a televised exchange of political
views influences judgments of political trust. Data for
Experiment 1 were analyzed by testing the difference
between mean levels of trust in the two conditions. As
shown in Figure 2, all three trust measures were significantly influenced in a negative direction by the less civil
exchange. Trust in Politicians became more negative,
even though the content of the talk show made it clear
that neither Bob nor Neil currently was, nor had ever
been, a member of Congress (F = 10.35, p < .001).
Likewise, Trust in Congress also became more negative
after only one 20-minute exposure (F = 6.00, p < .01).
Finally, attitudes toward the American political system
also were significantly, though more modestly, influenced by the civility of discourse (F = 3.12, p < .05).

13 In Experiment 1, the individual scales all achieved respectable
levels of reliability (see Appendix), but in Experiment 2, with a
much higher proportion of subjects drawn from the community, they
did not, unless combined into a single index of political trust.
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Effects of Incivility on Trust in Government and Politicians
0.40

Civil

Uncivil

Mean Trust Level (Standardized)

0.30
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Trust in Politicians

Trust in Congress
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Source: Experiment 1.
Note: Differences between civil and uncivil conditions were consistently significantly different in the expected direction (F = 10.35,
p < .01; F = 6.00, p < .01; and F = 3.12, p < .05). Corresponding partial eta-squared values were .14, .08, and .05.

We have suggested that viewers are experiencing a
visceral, gut-level negative reaction to violations of social norms. But others have proposed what might seem
a far simpler explanation: people simply dislike conflict,
and they see it as particularly unnecessary when the
answers to many political problems seem obvious to
ordinary people (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).
Perhaps, then, what we observe in Figure 2 is incivility
in public discourse leading people to lose respect for
the idea that free and open debate is an integral part
of our political process. If people often see poor examples of political disagreement, then attitudes toward
conflict and its importance in the democratic system
would naturally become more negative.
To evaluate this alternative explanation, we used two
scales tapping attitudes toward political conflict (see
Appendix for details); one of these tapped attitudes
toward congressional debate (including items such as
“Members of Congress bicker a lot more than they
need to”), and the second index tapped attitudes toward the importance of free and open political debate
(e.g., “It’s very important that politicians air their differences of opinion publicly”).
The civility of discourse in the experimental manipulation did not have any influence on evaluations of
conflict in either case. People apparently differentiated between the importance of public conflict—–that
is, the exchange of differing views, which remained
constant across the two presentations—–and the civility
of that conflict, which varied significantly. Popular discussions often conflate the extent to which disagreement takes place with the civility of those interactions, thus conflating greater hostility with greater

conflict. But in this study neither the combined
scales nor any one of the many individual items tapping attitudes toward conflict varied by experimental
condition.
The fact that viewers did not become more negative toward conflict lends support, albeit indirect, to
our assertion that viewers’ reactions stem from a visceral, gut-level negative reaction to incivility, one that
originates in face-to-face social norms, but that is applied without thought to televised politicians as well. In
order to examine evidence bearing more directly on
this hypothesis, we made use of a scale from the pretest
questionnaire that assesses the extent to which individuals approach or avoid situations involving conflict in
their everyday face-to-face discourse with others. The
Conflict Approach/Avoidance Scale was developed to
predict an individual’s willingness to make interpersonal conflicts explicit. It is known to have high reliability levels, minimal social desirability bias, and predictive validity based on willingness to participate in
conflict-related interventions, such as mediation. The
scale is also sensitive to different cultural norms related to conflict-related communication (see Goldstein
1999). The items included in this scale tap the extent
to which an individual enjoys challenging the opinions
of others, feels upset after an argument, and so forth
(see Appendix for details). If our theory is correct,
this individual difference should exacerbate reactions
to incivility. But if watching politicians on television
as purely a third-party observer bears no relation to
how people react when they themselves are personally
involved in disagreements, then reactions to televised
political incivility should not be contingent on what
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Size of Effect on Trust (Civil–Uncivil Presentation) by Level of Conflict Avoidance
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Source: Experiment 1.
Note: Pattern of results from analysis of variance including Civility (2) and Conflict Avoidance (3). Results demonstrate a significant
main effect for treatment (F = 10.37, p < .01, partial eta-squared = .15), as well as a significant interaction between Conflict Avoidance
and Civility (F = 5.81, p < .01, partial eta-squared = .16).

makes them uncomfortable in interpersonal interactions.
In order to see if responses to civility and incivility are different for those with varying propensities
for conflict avoidance, we divided the conflict avoidance scale into equal thirds of low, medium, and high
levels of conflict avoidance and then used an analysis of variance model including the main effects of
civility/incivility and of conflict avoidance, plus the interaction between conflict avoidance and civility. We
hypothesized that if the effects shown in Figure 2 were
truly based on a gut-level aversion to incivility in disagreements, then those most conflict-averse in faceto-face contexts should react most strongly to viewing
uncivil discourse as well. For purposes of this analysis,
we combine the three measures of political trust, given
that they are highly intercorrelated and generate identical patterns of results. Moreover, the reliability of the
general index of political trust is higher than any of the
individual indexes (α = .84).
Figure 3 shows the differences in levels of political
trust between the civil and the uncivil conditions, broken down by low, medium, and high levels of conflict
avoidance. As suggested by this pattern, the analysis
of variance model generated not only the significant main effect for civility that was already
observed (F = 10.37, p < .01), but also a highly significant interaction between conflict avoidance and incivility (F = 5.81, p < .01). Moreover, the partial etasquare values indicate that the effect of the interaction
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was, if anything, larger than the impact of incivility
alone.
As shown in Figure 3, the difference between levels
of political trust in the civil versus the uncivil condition was a function of individual differences in conflict
avoidance. For those who are generally uncomfortable
with face-to-face disagreement, the uncivil condition
generated much lower levels of political trust than
the uncivil condition. For those with moderate levels
of discomfort with conflict, we observed a somewhat
smaller differential. And for those who find disagreements somewhat enjoyable, the pattern was reversed in
that the uncivil condition generated slightly higher levels of political trust than the uncivil one. This pattern of
results lends credence to our interpretation of findings
based on the impact of personally “experiencing” disagreement via television viewing. Even though viewers
are not personally involved in the political disagreements they view, they nonetheless react in the same
fashion when televised disagreements violate face-toface norms.

Experiment 2
Our second experiment was designed to replicate and
extend the findings from the previous experiment. In
this study we recruited a much larger number of participants (n = 155), with many adult subjects recruited
from the community, and we extended the design to
include a control condition that viewed neither version
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of the political disagreements. We also used a different
set of issues in the talk show to ensure that our results
did not hinge on any one particular stimulus. Finally,
by including pretest assessments of the two candidates
based on their pictures alone, we also strengthened
our ability to claim that observed differences are due
to the candidates’ behavior during the televised program rather than simply effects of being exposed to
pictures of the two politicians. An analysis of variance
confirmed no significant differences among the three
conditions in pretest evaluations of the candidates.
In analyzing Experiment 2, our initial focus was
on determining whether the findings in Experiment 1
could be replicated using different stimuli to represent
civil and uncivil discourse. Table 1 shows the means
for the three separate indexes of political trust, plus
the combined index, broken down by civil and uncivil conditions. Despite the fact that the issues discussed in these stimuli were different from those in
Experiment 1, the effects of incivility on political trust
replicated across all three indexes. The results are virtually identical to those found in Experiment 1. The
civil presentation resulted in significantly higher levels of political trust than the uncivil exchange of the
same political views. This pattern extended to attitudes
toward Congress, politicians in general, and the entire U.S. system of government (F = 2.61 and p < .05,
F = 3.84 and p < .05, and F = 3.13 and p < .05, for
Congress, politicians, and government, respectively).
In order to determine whether civility was increasing
levels of political trust and/or incivility was decreasing
levels of trust, we compared the experimental means
to the control conditions using simple contrasts. Although the general pattern of results for two of the
three trust measures in Table 1 is suggestive of more
positive assessments from civil presentations and more
negative ones from uncivil ones, comparisons with the
control group means showed that the difference from
the control group was significant only in the uncivil
condition. Arguably, this null result could be due to the
substantially lower reliability of the indexes obtained in
Experiment 2 (see Appendix), which probably resulted

TABLE 1. Comparison of Civil, Uncivil, and
Control Means
Uncivil
Control
Civil
F
Condition Condition Condition value
Trust in
−.15
.03
.12
3.86∗
Politicians
(58)
(35)
(62)
(155)
Trust in
−.09
−.05
.12
2.71∗
Congress
(58)
(35)
(62)
(155)
Trust in System
−.17C
.15
.07
2.96∗
of Government
(58)
(35)
(62)
(155)
Political Trust
−.25C
.08
.19
5.67∗
Index
(58)
(35)
(62)
(155)
Source: Experiment 2.
Note: Cell entries are means, with sample sizes in parentheses.
All uncivil and civil means are significantly different from one
another at the p < .05 level.
C Conditions that are significantly different from the control condition for that variable at the p < .05 level.
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from the more diverse sample of subjects in this experiment. To further confirm the control group comparison,
we improved the reliability of the dependent variable
by combining the three highly intercorrelated sets of
items into a single index of Political Trust, as was done
in Experiment 1. This strategy succeeded in increasing
the reliability to acceptable levels (α = .75). But even
with the more reliable index, there still is no significant
difference between the control condition and the civil
presentation, and there remains a significant difference
between the control and the uncivil conditions (index,
F = 3.05, p < .05; planned comparisons between civil
and control, p > .60, and between uncivil and control,
p < .05).
This pattern is consistent with the theory offered as
to why people react negatively to incivility. Although
cognitively they may avow that the norm on television
is incivility, their expectations are based on the world
of interpersonal interaction, where civility is what is
expected. Incivility creates important deviations from
people’s default assumptions. Thus the civil condition
does not differ from the control condition, while the uncivil condition does. This pattern supports the assertion
that differences are caused by television’s departure
from interpersonal social norms. Viewing a civil interaction leaves political trust unchanged, but viewing
an uncivil interaction—–even for a mere 20 minutes—–
significantly lowers levels of political trust over not
viewing at all.
Based on this evidence, can we be confident that
viewers are reacting for the specific reasons we have
posited? Does viewing an uncivil political disagreement produce more negative feelings because it violates norms for face-to-face discourse? Thus far three
findings bolster support for this interpretation. First,
this effect is most pronounced among those who try to
avoid interpersonal conflict in their everyday lives—–
regardless of whether it is political or not. Second, this
pattern is clearly not a function of the impact the civility
manipulation has on attitudes toward the importance
of conflict per se; indeed we find no effects on attitudes toward the desirability of political conflict, despite our best efforts. Even immediately after viewing
a far-from-exemplary demonstration of the exchange
of political differences, viewers are no more likely to
see political conflict as petty, unnecessary bickering.
Finally, we also find that it is incivility in particular, the
counter-normative behavior that departs from face-toface expectations, that accounts for most of the negative effects observed. People expect political actors
to act in a predictable manner, an expectation based
on the world of face-to-face interaction, where civility
is the norm. When politicians do not act according to
these expectations, they create negative reactions in
viewers.
But is exposure to disagreement coupled with incivility truly producing the visceral, gut-level reaction
that we have hypothesized? A far simpler cognitive
explanation is that incivility simply lowers the esteem
with which viewers regard candidates. Viewers think
less of those who behave in an uncivil fashion, and those
candidates, as representatives of the larger category of
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political actors, lower the cumulative impression that
viewers have of politics and politicians. The evidence
from these experiments is not consistent with this incremental explanation because overall attitudes toward
the candidates (as measured by combined thermometer ratings for the two candidates) were not systematically affected by incivility. In Experiment 1, attitudes
toward one candidate were higher in the civil condition,
while attitudes toward the other were unaffected. In
Experiment 2, thermometer ratings were no higher in
the civil than in the uncivil condition. If citizens were
merely rationally updating their views about politicians
on the basis of these two men appearing less likable on
the whole in the uncivil condition, then this is not the
pattern of findings one would expect.

Experiment 3
To more directly test the idea that these reactions are
rooted in emotional, gut-level responses to viewing
political incivility, we ran a third experiment tapping
viewers’ physiological reactions to the same programs.
Using small electrodes attached to viewers’ hands
while they watched the programs, we recorded levels
of electrodermal activity, known as skin conductance,
throughout the viewing. Skin conductance measures
are a widely accepted measure of physiological arousal
and emotional response (see Dawson, Schell, and
Filion 2000) and have been used extensively in studies involving arousal responses to media (e.g., Lang
2000 and Reeves et al. 1999). Exposure to conflict in
face-to-face settings causes increased arousal, and incivility creates even higher levels, as if the human body

FIGURE 4.

were preparing for a response. If our theory is correct,
simply viewing others arguing in an uncivil fashion
should cause this same physiological reaction, even
though it makes no apparent sense to prepare for action in response to mere pictures. The uncivil political
conflict portrayed on television obviously cannot burst
into our living rooms to threaten us, yet our brains may
respond as if this were exactly what might happen.
Because there are often large individual differences
in skin conductance levels, we used a within-subject
design for Experiment 3 so that people watching uncivil exchanges could each be compared to themselves
watching civil disagreements. A within-subject design
also allowed us to obtain findings from a relatively
small sample of 16 subjects. In Experiment 3 each subject viewed two issue debates in a civil version and two
in an uncivil version. The order of issues and assignment of a given issue to the civil or uncivil condition
for each subject were completely randomized in a Latin
Square design to cancel out potential issue and/or order
effects. Three hundred data points for skin conductance
level were collected across the five-minute period. We
then analyzed the effects of the civility manipulation
on these data while controlling for time as a repeatedmeasures factor.
Figure 4 illustrates average levels of skin conductance over the five minutes of issue discussion. As with
reactions to other new stimuli, skin conductance levels
are highest at the onset of a stimulus presentation and
then decline monotonically. Time was a highly significant factor in the analysis given that more time consistently produces lower levels of arousal with any form of
media stimuli. But when people viewed issue debates
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Note: Points represent averages based on civil and uncivil means. Incivility produced significantly higher levels of physiological arousal
(t = 14.38, p < .001).
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Source: Experiment 2.
Note: Both variables are measured on one to five-point scales. The means for Perceived Informativeness do not differ significantly
(F = .01, p > .05). The means for Perceived Entertainment Value are significantly different in the civil and uncivil conditions (F = 14.79,
p < .001, partial eta-squared = .11).

in their uncivil versions, the same exchanges caused
significantly higher levels of arousal, just as our theory
predicted (t = 14.38, p < .001). Over the entire series,
issue presentations shown in the uncivil version were
significantly more emotionally arousing than those in
the civil version. Because the subjects in Experiment 3
were exposed to both civil and uncivil discourse, we
did not predict effects on levels of political trust in
Experiment 3. Overall, any such effects should have
cancelled one another out by the time of the posttest.
Given that politics is not a highly arousing topic for
most citizens, and that this program was of the relatively unexciting, yet common, “talking heads” variety, it is noteworthy that incivility applied to standard political issues can produce primitive reactions
in those who are merely viewing others engaged in
disagreement. Television viewers are notoriously passive, “third-party” spectators when it comes to politics.
And yet, at a very basic physical level, they are reacting to incivility on the screen as if it were very real
indeed.

Popularity of the Program
The finding shown in Figure 4 begs the additional question of whether arousal is tapping characteristics of programs that also make them popular with viewers. Measures available in Experiment 2 allowed us to examine
this hypothesis. One battery of five items addressed the

Perceived Entertainment Value of the program, and
another battery of five items tapped its Perceived Informativeness (see Appendix). As shown in Figure 5, the
civil and uncivil versions of these discussions were perceived as equally informative, and rightly so given that
they included precisely the same amount of substantive political information. But overwhelmingly, viewers
found the uncivil version of this public affairs talk show
more entertaining, indicating that it was more interesting, more exciting, and so forth (F = 15.61, p < .001,
for main effect of incivility). They also indicated a much
weaker to desire to view the program again in the future if they viewed the civil version. Unfortunately, the
kind of presentation of political conflict that is likely
to attract audiences and build television revenues does
not appear to be the one that best serves democratic
citizens.

DISCUSSION
Experiments 1 and 2 consistently demonstrate that incivility in televised political discourse has adverse effects on political trust relative to civil discussions of the
same political substance. The effects we have isolated
are surprising, in part because of the brief nature of the
stimulus—–a 20-minute television program—–and in part
because political trust is typically regarded as a more
stable attribute of individuals, one that changes slowly
and incrementally, if at all, or perhaps suddenly in the
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case of startling news events such as the Watergate
scandal in the 1970s. Our studies suggest a surprisingly
high level of malleability in political trust. If even a
brief exposure to political debate can produce these
systematic changes, it is clearly more volatile than previously thought.
This observation naturally leads to the question of
whether these laboratory-induced effects persist over
time. Experiment 2 provided an opportunity to examine this question. Our experimental subjects were
asked at the time of their participation if they would
consent to a follow-up phone call at home after the
experiment itself, and just over 60% of the subjects
agreed and provided phone numbers where they could
be reached. The Center for Survey Research at Ohio
State University conducted the follow-up interviews,
which included the same battery of trust questions
as in the posttest questionnaire administered in the
laboratory.14 Given the malleability observed in the
laboratory, we anticipated that the effects of the manipulations should have dissipated by the time of the
phone interviews (see Druckman and Nelson 2003).
This pattern was expected because subsequent exposure to political discourse should swamp the influence
of any short stimulus.
The findings from this analysis basically confirmed
our hypothesis.15 The uncivil group “bounced back”
to the level of trust in the posttest control group, that
is, back to the level of trust it had before incivility in
the laboratory temporarily depressed levels of political trust in this group. The civil group, which tended
to be slightly, though not significantly, more trusting
than the control group in the initial posttest, lowered
its levels of trust somewhat in the follow-up interview
relative to movement in the control group. By the time
of the follow-up interview, there were no significant
differences by original experimental condition.
These findings suggest that the effects we observed in
the lab may be transient and short-lived. But given that
our brief manipulation was designed to simulate the
persistent, often rancorous tenor of televised political
interactions, we may already be witnessing substantial
ongoing effects based on television’s tendency toward
dramatic conflict. Indeed, if one envisions the cumulative impact of repeated exposure to incivility, then
low levels of political trust are not surprising. On the
other hand, to the extent that civil political discourse
14 Interviews were attempted roughly three weeks after the experiment and were completed, on average, one month after participation
occurred. Although attrition in sample size between the laboratory
results and the follow-up interview reduced the strength of our original laboratory findings, the posttest means for the subsample that
was observable at both times maintained the same initial pattern of
significant differences among civil, uncivil, and control conditions
(F = 2.61, p < .05).
15 To analyze these data, we used a two factor mixed-model analysis
of variance with one repeated measure, within-subjects factor (levels
of political trust immediately after the experiment and one month
later), and one between-subjects factor (experimental condition),
plus the interaction between the two. Although the interaction between experimental condition and time approached statistical significance, this finding occurred because of differential change over time
by experimental condition.
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is equally prevalent, one would expect these effects to
cancel themselves out.
The generalizability of these findings outside of the
laboratory, outside of the collection of stimuli used
in this experiment, and outside of these subjects also
warrants consideration. With respect to experimental
subjects, we are on stronger-than-usual footing because
we did not rely exclusively on college student subjects.
In addition, our subjects were drawn from the larger
community in a medium-sized metropolitan area. They
incorporated a range of ages, educational levels, and
socioeconomic backgrounds, and we found no differential effects between subjects obtained through different
means of recruitment.
We used a political talk show as a realistic pretext
for these stimuli, but not out of a desire to draw conclusions about the effects of talk shows as much as to
evaluate the consequences of uncivil discourse more
generally. Uncivil discourse can and has appeared on
regular news programs and in political debates, as well
as on talk shows of various kinds. The level of incivility
demonstrated by the political actors in our program
was relatively mild compared to the hostility exhibited in many of today’s political talk shows, and this
was done purposely in an effort to extend the generalizability of the findings. Those engaged in uncivil
repartee are typically not the candidates themselves
but, rather, representatives from opposing campaigns
or issue camps. These differences could have heightened the sense of norm violation viewers experienced
while watching these programs. But the requirement
that viewers’ perceptions of the candidates’ political
positions be identical across civil and uncivil conditions
meant that we were limited in the extent of incivility
that would make sense in this context.
On the one hand, because of the laboratory setting
our subjects undoubtedly paid closer attention to the
television program than they might have in a more naturalistic context. Greater attention is likely to create
greater potential for emotional reactions of the kind
we have observed. But the types of issues discussed
in these programs may have counterbalanced any such
increase. None of the issues discussed were particularly
emotion-laden issues relative to other possible topics.
In general, one would expect issues such as same-sex
marriage or flag burning to prompt much stronger emotional reactions. Nonetheless, regardless of which subset of issue disagreements we used, our findings were
consistent. All of the issues used in the program had
been in the news at the time of the taping of the mock
talk show, and they remained topical for the duration
of the experiments. Our pretest questionnaires showed
that most subjects had opinions to report on most of the
issues that were discussed. On a few topics, such as free
trade, subjects had fairly strong views, but on the whole
these were not the sort of issues likely to elicit strong
reactions. If the discussion had involved so-called “hot
button” issues, we would expect much stronger reactions. Likewise, should the discussion have occurred
among politicians toward whom our respondents
already had strong feelings, their reactions might have
been stronger.
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Our studies also add to the burgeoning literature
on emotion and politics, and point to fruitful avenues
for future research in this vein. Although advances in
research on the role of emotion in politics have been
notable in recent years (e.g., Marcus, Neuman, and
MacKuen 2000), most use traditional survey methods
that ask people to think about and label feelings. While
useful in some respects, these self-reports have obvious limitations in that they require people to engage
in cognitive processing in order to label their emotions. Ultimately, less reflective methods such as those
demonstrated here are also needed in order to advance
knowledge in this area.

CONCLUSION
Political disagreement is inevitable and unavoidable,
and also quite desirable from the perspective of most
democratic theory. In this study we examined the
hypothesis that it is the manner in which such disagreement is presented that discourages positive attitudes toward politics and politicians. The results of
these experiments show that uncivil political discourse
has detrimental effects on political trust. Not only
were attitudes toward politicians and Congress affected, but levels of support for the institutions of
government themselves also were influenced. Importantly, these effects occurred even though the extent
of substantive disagreement/political conflict was held
constant.
Whether those effects are specific to televised exposure to incivility is a complex question. For example,
a print version of this same program—–even a direct
transcript—–would not be perceived as demonstrating
the same extent of incivility as the television program,
in which viewers witnessed nonverbal and paralinguistic cues such as Bob sneering at Neil and Neil shaking
his head ruefully while Bob was speaking. Two newspaper articles could purposely be written to come across
as just as civil and uncivil to their readers as the civil
and uncivil talk show was to its viewers. But then the
newspaper articles’ substantive content and perspective would have to be quite different from that of the
television version. Ultimately substantive differences
between media would make it difficult to argue that
any observed effects of incivility are uniquely due to
televised incivility, as opposed to differences in the content of the messages themselves.
Although a “critical test” of this theory may not be
possible, we have nonetheless taken an important step
forward in answering an overlooked, yet very basic
question: “How do images of leaders, as seen on television, influence the public’s attitudes and beliefs?”
(Sullivan and Masters 1987, 881). Our theoretical
framework shows that television is likely to exacerbate
effects of incivility, even if this effect is not necessarily limited to televised incivility. It seems doubtful, for
example, that reading about a heated political controversy in the newspaper would cause the same extent
of heightened physiological arousal that watching that
same conflict on television causes (see Funk 2001). De-
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spite the fact that most viewers might acknowledge, at
a purely cognitive level, that incivility is the norm for
televised political debate, viewers react as if norms are
being violated.
Scholars may disagree about the proper interpretation of the target of distrust in these well-known
questions, but low levels of political trust are widely
believed to have consequences for American political
institutions. Extremely low levels of trust may threaten
the stability of political institutions, but there are more
immediate consequences as well. Political institutions
are able to function more smoothly with high levels
of trust. Low levels of trust contribute to “a political
environment in which it is more difficult for leaders to
succeed” (Hetherington 1998, 791).
So why does this detrimental state of affairs persist?
Bill O’Reilly (2001), host of the highly contentious political talk show, The O’Reilly Factor, suggests that incivility is essential to the success of political programs: “If
a producer can find someone who eggs on conservative
listeners to spout off and prods liberals into shouting
back, he’s got a hit show. The best host is the guy or
gal who can get the most listeners extremely annoyed
over and over and over again.” By behaving outside
the boundaries of civil discourse, O’Reilly goads his
viewers into reacting strongly to what might otherwise
be dull exchanges of political perspectives.
For most people, politics on its own merits is not
sufficiently exciting to compete with American Idol or
E.R. for television audiences, so it requires the drama
and tension of uncivil human conflict to make it more
interesting to watch. Although some defenders of public virtue argue that the American public is chomping
at the bit for serious, high-quality political television,
the ratings that programs receive suggest that this is
not the case.
There is an obvious paradox embedded in these findings. On the one hand, viewers respond negatively to
incivility in the judgments they make about politicians
and government. On the other hand, they are clearly
drawn to incivility, and enjoy watching it much more
than civil programming. Funk (2001) equates this phenomenon to “rubbernecking,” the traffic delays caused
by people who slow down to look at accidents or other,
predominantly negative, events. How do we explain
why people are simultaneously attracted to and repulsed by political conflict? At a very basic psychological level, aggressiveness demands attention (Bradley
2000). And yet, in a culture where political disagreements are ideally not resolved by duels, what will pique
viewers’ interest in political debate enough to get them
to pay attention?
In one sense these results can be viewed as a classic
case of market failure; in other words, it is a situation in
which market forces do not best serve the interests of
democracy. But the solution to this predicament is not
as simple as blaming the commercial structure of American television. Even if all political programs looked
like the most sober and civil political programming,
they would do little good if no one watched. And thus
we are left with the quandary of how to create political
programming that is both interesting and exciting to
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watch yet not likely to damage public attitudes in a
significant way.

APPENDIX: CONSTRUCTION AND
RELIABILITY OF INDICATORS
Note: Unless otherwise noted, all responses were on a fivepoint scale, from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

Trust in Politicians (Expt 1, α = .79; Expt 2,
α = .53)
(1) Politicians generally have good intentions. (2) Politicians
in the U.S. do not deserve much respect. (3) When politicians
make statements to the American people on television or in
the newspapers, they are usually telling the truth. (4) Most
politicians can be trusted to do what is right. (5) Despite what
some people say, most politicians try to keep their campaign
promises. (6) Most politicians do a lot of talking but they do
little to solve the really important issues facing the country.
(7) Most politicians are dedicated people and we should be
grateful to them for the work they do.

Trust in Congress (Expt 1, α = .74; Expt 2,
α = .29)
(1) As far as the people running Congress are concerned,
would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only
some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?
(2) How much of the time do you think you can trust members
of the U.S. Congress to do what is right? Just about always,
most of the time, or only some of the time? (3) Again, using
this same feeling thermometer, how do you feel about the
U.S. Congress?

Trust in the Political System (Expt 1, α = .66;
Expt 2, α = .63)
(1) At present I feel very critical of our political system.
(2) Whatever its faults may be, the American form of government is still the best for us. (3) There is not much about our
form of government to be proud of. (4) It may be necessary
to make some major changes in our form of government in
order to solve the problems facing our country. (5) I would
rather live under our form of government that any other I
can think of.

Political Trust Index (Expt 1, α = .84; Expt 2,
α = .75)
This index was a combination of items used in three subindexes.

Importance of Open Political Debate (Expt 1,
α = .72)
(1) It’s very important that politicians air their differences
of opinion publicly. (2) You can’t have a democracy without
political opposition. (3) You really can’t be sure whether
an opinion is correct or not unless people are free to argue
against it. (4) Unless many points of view are presented, there
is little chance that the truth can ever be known.
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Importance of Congressional Debate (Expt 1,
α = .61)
(1) Bickering among members of Congress does not help to
solve our nation’s problems. (2) Members of Congress bicker
a lot more than they need to.

Conflict Avoidance Scale (from Goldstein
1999) (Expt 1, α = .79)
(1) I hate arguments. (2) I find conflicts exciting. (3) I enjoy challenging the opinions of others. (4) Arguments don’t
bother me. (5) I feel upset after an argument. This is a 35point scale divided into thirds representing low, medium, and
high levels of conflict avoidance.

Perceived Entertainment Value of Political
Program (Expt 2, α = .88)
(1) In general, I found the program to be entertaining for
a political talk show. (2) This program was sometimes very
lively. (3) This program was dull and boring even by the
standards of political talk shows. (4) The pace of the show
was too slow. (5) Compared to other political talk shows, this
one was better at keeping my attention.

Perceived Informativeness of Political
Program (Expt 2, α = .83)
(1) In general, I found the program to be informative.
(2) I learned new things about public issues from this program. (3) This program gave me food for thought. (4) If
I needed information about an upcoming election, I would
watch this program. (5) I felt like I got to know the candidates
by watching this program. (6) As a result of watching this
program, I’d be more comfortable talking to friends about
this race or about these issues.

Manipulation Checks for Perceived Levels
of Civility and Ideology
How would you describe [Bob Lindzey/Neil Scott]? Using
the word pairs below, please circle the dot that best describes him. Word pair anchors on nine-point scales included
liberal–conservative, emotional–unemotional, quarrelsome–
cooperative, friendly–hostile, rude–polite, calm–agitated,
and Democrat–Republican. Measures for Neil and Bob were
combined for purposes of the manipulation check.
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